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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO 
CHARLES MURRAY, Administrator 
of the Estate of 
SAMUEL H. SHEPP ARD 
VS. 
STATE OF OHIO 
Defendant 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Judge Ronald Suster 
Case No. 312322 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM 
REGARDING 
INADMISSIBILITY OF IMPROPER 
HEARSAY AND 
CHARACTER EVIDENCE 
Plaintiff hereby submits this supplemental memorandum to further enjoin the use of 
inadmissible hearsay and improper use of character evidence. 
Respectfully submitted, 
;Ji LI 'r~-~~ert ciM1{fs~t/ 
George H. Carr (0069372) 
1700 Standard Building 
1370 Ontario Street 
Cleveland, OH 44113 
(216) 241-1430 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
-;~. 
-
I. Introduction 
In 1954, Judge Blythin of this Court committed error by admitting tainted testimony into 
evidence at the trial of Dr. Samuel H. Sheppard. As more fully set forth in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 
384 U.S. 333, 337 (1966), the Supreme Court adjudged the 1954 trial proceedings and the 
flagrant admission of tainted testimony as a "Roman holiday." Id. at 345-352. 
This year, in an attempt to prevent the State of Ohio from repeating the past, Dr. 
Sheppard filed several motions in limine to prevent the State from proffering evidence that was 
tainted or otherwise inadmissible. The State argued vigorously against Dr. Sheppard's motions, 
claiming that the proffer of such evidence was relevant, admissible, and that the State would 
show how such evidence was relevant to the issues raised by the pleadings. As a result of the 
State's arguments, Dr. Sheppard's motions were denied and the State was given maximum cross-
examinatory leeway. 
After just one week of testimony, the court has now been confronted with what Dr. 
Sheppard warned -- that the State of Ohio would do its level best to improperly use tainted and 
inadmissible evidence to "defend" the allegations made by Dr. Sheppard. In point of fact, rather 
than defend the allegations made by Dr. Sheppard, the State is attempting to "prosecute" Dr. 
Sheppard in abstentia by reenacting the same mistakes made by the prosecution at the 1954 trial. 
The court has now requested memoranda from counsel to curtail the admission such 
inadmissible testimony. 
II. Law and Argument 
The State of Ohio has made clear their self-serving theme of the case. They suggest that 
the relationship between Dr. Sheppard and his wife, Marilyn Sheppard, was a "powder keg." 
They even go so far as to suggest, albeit without any support, that the powder keg was "ignited 
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by a match" on the evening of Mrs. Sheppard's murder. However, the State has admitted that 
they do not know what ignited this so-called powder keg. Instead, they have asked the court and 
the jury to make an incredible leap of faith and to infer from various irrelevant and unrelated 
circumstances that: 1) there existed a troubled marriage between Dr. and Mrs. Sheppard; 2) that 
the marriage was in such disarray that Dr. Sheppard would have the desire to kill his wife; 3) that 
Dr. Sheppard would have the ability to kill his wife; and 4) that Dr. Sheppard did, in fact, kill his 
wife. In what can only can only be described as "an inference, upon an inference, upon an 
inference, upon an inference," the State has once again attempted to use innuendo and character 
assassination to defend this case. By soliciting such testimony, over objection, the State of Ohio 
has committed reversible error and their self-serving "powder keg" has blown up in their face. 
A. Inadmissible Hearsay 
The State of Ohio has begun to solicit inadmissible hearsay and double-hearsay evidence 
in an attempt to show that Dr. Sheppard may have been involved in the crime charged against 
him in 1954, and for which he was acquitted. Confronting the baseline issue of hearsay, it 
requires a rudimentary definition: 
Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial 
or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 
Evid.R. 801(C). Double hearsay exists when a statement, other than the one made by the 
declarant, is recorded in some form by one party, but recited at trial or a hearing by yet another 
party. State v. Taylor (Montgomery 1992), 82 Ohio App.3d 434, 612 N.E.2d 728. In either case, 
the testimony is absolutely inadmissible unless there exists a valid exception to the hearsay rule. 
Id. To date, the State has attempted to avoid the hearsay rule of exclusion by raising the "present 
sense impression" and "state of mind" exceptions to the hearsay rule. 
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The present sense impression exception applies only to "a statement describing or 
explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, 
or immediately thereafter." Evid.R. 803(1 ). This narrow exception to the hearsay rule of 
exclusion is only applicable when the subject statement was made at a time and under 
circumstances in which the person to whom the statement was made would be in a position to 
verify the statement. Evid. R. 803( l ), Staff Notes, 1980. Clearly, this exception requires not 
only that the statement be observed or recorded at or near the time it was made hut also that the 
person to whom the statement was made could con.firm or deny the truth and veracity oft he 
statement. Id. 
The state of mind exception, also known as res gestae exception, only applies to "a 
statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition 
[sic] but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or 
believed." Evid.R. 803(3 )[emphasis supplied]. This exception is a restatement of traditional 
common law exceptions pertaining to bodily and emotional conditions, as more fully described 
in the seminal case on the exception, Mutual Life Ins. Co. ofNew York v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 
(1892). For instance, a person, other than the declarant, recalling that the declarant said, "I feel 
sick," is admissible under the state of mind exception. Whereas, a person recalling the declarant 
to say, "I believe John Smith is a nice person," does not fall under the state of mind exception 
because it does not describe a feeling of physical or emotional import. lsL The mechanical 
application of this narrow hearsay exception is simply improper as a means to put before the 
court any and all statements of belief or memory. In point of fact, it is absolutely improper. 
The State attempts to argue that Dr. Sheppard's statements are not hearsay for a variety of 
reasons. It first argues that since the State is offering the statements of Dr. Sheppard in order to 
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show their falsity, and that they are therefore not offered for the "truth" of the matters asserted 
therein. The cases cited by the State do not support this theory: State v. Williams (1988), 38 
Ohio St. 3d 346, 528 N.E.2d 910, involved a situation where a written statement to police was 
admitted solely to impeach a witness who denied speaking to the police; State v. Workman 
(1984), 14 Ohio App. 3d 385, 471 N.E.2d 853, 14 Ohio B.Rep. 490, involved a witness who 
testified simply that another witness had told him something different before trial than what the 
witness had related on the witness stand. Neither of these cases stands for the proposition that 
matters offered to prove their falsity are not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted; in 
fact, Workman, in a separate portion of the opinion, indicates correctly that previous inconsistent 
statements may only be introduced in cross-examination against a witness on the stand, and may 
not be elicited through direct examination. 
The State also argues that previous hearsay statements of Dr. Sheppard have been 
admitted, allowing Ohio R.Evid. 806 to justify the admission of further hearsay; however, any 
such statements were admitted on cross-examination over Plaintiff's objection. The State's 
argument that it "is entitled to demonstrate to the jury that Samuel H. Sheppard told inconsistent 
versions" is unsupported by any applicable law. 
Perhaps the most ludicrous argument made by the State to justify the admissibility of Dr. 
Sheppard's statements is that Plaintiff here, Dr. Sheppard's estate, has "certainly manifested its 
adoption and/or belief of the truth of Samuel H. Sheppard's statements relative to his claim of 
innocence and wrongful imprisonment." State's Brief at 7. The State argues that since 
801 (D)(2)(b) has been used to admit statements against parties who have expressly manifested 
belief in those statements, "it is no huge leap to hold that the rule was also intended to place an 
estate in a survivorship action squarely in the shoes of the decedent by holding the estate to the 
5 
--
-
statements of the decedent." IQ., In fact, this is a huge leap, and would destroy the notion of 
privity which this Court has already held to prevent the use of 801 (D)(2)( a) to j us ti fy the 
admission of Dr. Sheppard's statements. Were this Court to adopt the State's position on 
801(D)(2)(b), every estate that filed a lawsuit to protect the rights of its decedent would 
somehow be automatically adopting every statement made by the decedent. Instead, this Court 
should follow the common-sense understanding of 801 (D)(2)(b ): where a party to lawsuit 
expressly manifests his adoption of another person's statement as his own, it may be admitted 
against him. As to the State's argument that "Samuel Reese Sheppard has manifested his belief 
in his father's innocence and his father's version of events in numerable ways," only two points 
need be made: first, Mr. Sheppard is not a party to this lawsuit and is permitted to sit at the trial 
table only through the courtesy of this Court; second, Mr. Sheppard's personal opinions and 
beliefs about his father's story are not evidence in this proceeding. 
Further, the State of Ohio recently revealed the name of Robert Bailey as a potential 
witness. The only connection that Mr. Bailey has to this matter is having been allegedly present 
during a conversation between his wife, Donna Bailey, and Marilyn Sheppard. According to a 
police report generated by Patrick Bureau of the Cleveland Police Department, Mrs. Sheppard 
made a statement to Donna Bailey that she, Mrs. Shepprd, was going to "drag Dr. Sheppard's 
name through the mud." According to the report, Mr. Bailey was present to overhear Mrs. 
Sheppard's statement. For numerous reasons, this exchange is inadmissible. However, in just 
the context of the hearsay rule of exclusion, it is inadmissible. 
Foremost, it is presumed that the State of Ohio will attempt to solicit the content of Mrs. 
Sheppard's statement through their recently disclosed witness, Robert Bailey. To the extent that 
the statement is being related at trial by a person other than the declarant, it falls under the 
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hearsay rule of exclusion. Therefore, an inquiry then needs to be made into whether it falls under 
on of the narrow exceptions to the hearsay rule that the State would otherwise mechanically 
apply. As for present sense impression, there exists no content of the communication by Mrs. 
Sheppard that describes an event or condition. That is, she is not describing a burning house, a 
car accident, or any other event upon which she could relate her "present sense impression." 
Moreover, the statement was not related at or near the time of any event or condition. In 
particular, according to the police report, the statement was made at a cocktail reception long 
after any fact or circumstance that gave rise to Mrs. Sheppard's statement. There again, the 
statement would not fall under the present sense exception. Lastly, the person to whom the 
statement was made, Donna Bailey, could not confirm or deny the truth or veracity of the 
statements contained therein. That is, Mrs. Bailey was unable then and there to confirm whether 
or not Mrs. Sheppard would "drag his name through the mud." That speculative statement was 
simply unverifiable. To the extent that the State attempts to solicit the statement though Mr. 
Bailey, there exist the same insurmountable hurdles that are in place should the state choose to 
utilize Mrs. Bailey as a conduit for the inadmissible testimony. Furthermore, Mr. Bailey was not 
the person to whom the statement was directed and therefore, cannot in any way act as a conduit 
for the admission of the objectionable testimony. 
As for the state of mind exception, an attempt to use that narrow exception as grounds for 
the admission of Mrs. Sheppard's statement falls flat. In suggesting that Marilyn Sheppard was 
going to drag Dr. Sheppard's name through the mud, the focus of the statement was speculative 
at best and unconfirmed and supported with even the best of hindsight at worst. At no time does 
the graveman of the statement suggest a feeling that Mrs. Sheppard was currently experiencing --
such as pain in her leg. The statement is simply classic hearsay and the State of Ohio is clearly 
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attempting to mechanically apply what has become a generically used exception to the hearsay 
rule of exclusion. However, with just a cursory review of the hearsay rules, it is evident that the 
statement is inadmissible in any event. 1 
B. Inadmissible Character Evidence 
Evidence Rule 404 states quite clearly that, "evidence of a person's character or a trait of 
his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith 
on a particular occasion .... " Evid.R. 404(A)[emphasis supplied]. Exceptions to this rule exist 
only in criminal cases when the defendant first offers such character evidence. Evid.R. 
404(A)( 1 ),(2). 
Under the same general evidence rule it states, "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts 
is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." 
Evid.R. 404(8 ). In a general sense, past acts of wrongdoing are not admissible at all to show that 
a person acted in a similar manner on a different occasion. The second clause of the section, 
however, is often bastardized by prosecutors to suggest that prior bad acts are admissible, so long 
as the prosecution "announces" that the purpose of the proffer is to suggest motive or intent. 
This is simply not the case and the State of Ohio should be prevented from abusing the rule. 
As indicated above, character evidence is inadmissible to prove conduct on a particular 
occasion. for instance, evidence that a person is careless is not admissible to prove. or even 
suggest, that the person was negligent while driving a vehicle. See Hatsio v. Red Cab Co., 77 
A !though the focus of this argument is on just one proffered statement, the same law holds true to 
for all attempts by the State of Ohio to proffer hearsay statements that fail to fall under the true definition of either 
the present sense impression or the state of mind exception. 
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Ohio App. 301 (1945). Unless a defendant in a criminal matter offers proof of his "good 
character" in defense of the charges alleged, the prosecution may not utilize character evidence to 
suggest otherwise. With this limited exception, character evidence is strictly inadmissible. 2 
Nonetheless, the State of Ohio has chosen to pursue a course of presenting character evidence, 
not prior bad acts to be described below, to show that Dr. Sheppard may have been involved in 
the killing of his wife. This type of pursuit is strictly proscribed by rule and rises to the level of 
reversible error. See State v. Johnson, 71 Ohio St.3d 332, 643 N.E.2d I 098 (1995) (holding that 
evidence of accused's character, such as referring to women as "whores" and the accused's past 
sexual history, was inadmissible to suggest that the accused acted in conformity therewith by 
killing his sister). 
As for prior acts, those acts may not fall into the category of "any prior acts." Rather, 
there are specific prerequisites for their admission. Foremost, they must specifically relate to the 
offense charged. State v. Wogenstahl, 75 Ohio St.3d 344, 662 N .E.2d 311 ( 1996). Because 
Evid.R. 404(8) codifies and exception to the common law, it must be strictly construed against 
admissibility. State v. Coleman, 45 Ohio St.3d 298, 544 N.E.2d 622 (1989). Moreover, the acts 
described or proffered must be not only closely related in nature to the act at issue, but the prior 
acts must be close in time and place to the act at issue. State v. Goines, 111 Ohio St.3d 840, 677 
N .E.2d 412 (1996). Further, it is incumbent for a trial court to determine the exact reason for 
which the prior act evidence is being offered and the court must determine the relevancy of such 
Of course, the State of Ohio has previously taken the position that these proceedings are civil in 
nature and therefore neither exception under Evid.R. 404(A)( I) or (2) would apply since those exceptions are 
limited to criminal actions. To the extent that the State attempts to apply either exception, this court should revisit 
each and every motion in limine filed by Dr. Sheppard in which the State replied with, "this is not a criminal case 
and therefore criminal rules do not apply." Nonetheless, Dr. Sheppard maintains that the general constitutional 
mandates raised in his motions in limine apply regardless of the context and that Dr. Sheppard did not first offer 
evidence of his character at trial, therefore neither exception would apply in any event. 
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evidence and to which of the specific exceptions to evidence would be offered, i.e., modus 
operandi, opportunity, lack of mistake. State v. McCronell, 91 Ohio App.3d 141, 631 N.E.2d 
1110 ( 1993 ). For instance, the prior theft of a telephone may be irrelevant and inadrnissi ble for 
any purpose in a trial for manslaughter. But, the prior theft of a telephone would be admissible 
to show the absence of mistake if a person claims that he ran from the scene of a crime because 
he was unable to call for help since he did not know what a telephone looked like. 
To the extent that the State of Ohio tries to offer any statement or prior act pertaining to 
Dr. Sheppard's character, the evidence is inadmissible as a matter oflaw. To the extent that any 
evidence is proffered as to prior acts, the evidence should be proscribed because no prior "act" of 
Dr. Sheppard can be retold that has any bearing, relevance or similarity to the crime charged in 
1954.3 
The State also argues that Plaintiff has "opened the door" to character evidence of Dr. 
Sheppard by presenting "through the testimony of numerous witnesses evidence that Samuel H. 
Sheppard was supposed a good, even-tempered man with a happy and satisfying marriage." 
State's Brief at 8. Two points rebut this argument: first, Plaintiff has introduced no evidence of 
character, only of professional reputation; second, it was the State's cross-examination of Mr. 
Bailey that raised the issue of Dr. Sheppard's character, but no evidence was in fact offered 
regarding character. 
The State's final argument regarding Ohio R.Evid. 404(B) exposes the inconsistency (and 
unworkability) of the State's position: after arguing that Mr. Eberling's other acts were prevented 
by 404(8), the State now argues that Dr. Sheppard's other acts are "independently admissible ... 
As a matter of completeness, it should always be determined by the court what constitutes a "prior 
bad act." "Statements" are not "acts." "Walking" to and from a hospital are not prior "bad" acts. 
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- for the purpose of establishing the reasons and motives actuating Samuel H. Sheppard's conduct" 
in spite of 404(B). State's Brief at 8-9. As the State has noted in arguing previous motions in 
this case, the fact that some evidence may be critical or important to establishing a party's case is 
irrelevant in determining its admissibility. Regardless of how much the State wants to prove that 
Dr. Sheppard committed this crime by relying on some similarity to alleged prior "bad acts," 
such evidence is prohibited by Ohio R.Evid. 404(8). 
C. Improper Use of Testimony for the Purpose of Establishing an Inference Upon an 
Inference 
Perhaps the most disturbing of all tactics gestated by the State of Ohio is their attempt to 
prove their self-serving theme of the case by way stacking inferences upon inferences. Ohio still 
adheres to the prohibition of stacked inferences. Donaldson v. Northern Trading Co., 82 Ohio 
- App.3d 4 76 (1992). Although the law is slightly more restricted in Ohio than in other 
jurisdictions, it is still impermissible to "draw [sic] one inference solely and entirely from 
another inference .... " Id. at 481. At almost every turn, the State of Ohio has asked the jury, and 
this court, to draw an inference from an inference. For instance, the State relies upon 
scant evidence to allege that Dr. and Mrs. Sheppard had a troubled marriage. Even assuming this 
to be true, the state would have the jury infer that because of the troubled marriage, Dr. Sheppard 
had the desire to end the marriage. Without any further supporting facts or circumstances, the 
State would have the jury infer from that inference that Dr. Sheppard had the desire to kill his 
wife -- an enormous leap of faith. From that inference, the State would have a jury infer that Dr. 
Sheppard formed the intent to kill his wife. From that inference, the State would have a jury 
infer that Dr. Sheppard had the opportunity to kill his wife. Thereafter, one would have to infer 
- that Dr. Sheppard did, in fact, kill his wife. These impermissible "stacked inferences" gestate 
11 
--
-
from scant hearsay and impermissible character evidence offered by the State. To proscribe the 
State's inappropriate desire to have a jury stack inferences, the proffered evidence that sets the 
chain of inferences in motion should be prohibited. 
III. Conclusion 
Wherefore, Plaintiff respectfully requests this court to prohibit the introduction of any 
character evidence of Dr. Sheppard and Marilyn Sheppard, and to prohibit any hearsay evidence that 
is not being offered under a properly applied exception, and which this court knows to be offered 
by the State for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter contained therein. 
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Certificate of Service 
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing Plaintiff's Memorandum Regarding 
Inadmissibility of Improper Character and Hearsay Evidence has been served on William Mason, 
Prosecuting Attorney, Justice Center, 9th Floor, 1200 Ontario Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44113 on 
/) ,,,,) 
this ~l day of February, 2000. 
ge H. Carr (0069372) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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